Abstract
International law is the least consideration when powerful states weaned in realist doctrine like Russia decide to pursue their national interest. For Putin, the pursuit of power and maintaining control in Russia’s sphere of influence trumps every legal consideration. Nevertheless, Putin makes the effort to frame Russia’s war of aggression as a legitimate “special military operation” compelled by existential threat from Ukraine and the West. Putin’s framing of the war is a crude attempt to project Russia as a law-abiding state forced to defend itself against Kiev and its Western allies. Although Moscow continues to enjoy patronage from members of BRICS+, however, several United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions have pronounced Russia guilty as charged. This paper makes the point that international law may lack a superior enforcement agent, yet violation of international law even by powerful states like Russia attracts both reputational and economic consequences.
Key Words: International law, Russia, Putin, Ukraine, UNGA, Western allies.
Introduction
International law, the body of law that regulates the relationship between entities that are bestowed with international personality is very often the least consideration, when powerful states decide to protect their “national interest.” This lack of regard for international law by these entities as revealed by the case study of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, is the root cause of many crises around the world.
Another source of tension is the clash between primacy of sovereignty and claim to non-interference in domestic matters by states versus the overriding need for international intervention due to humanitarian or global security reasons by Inter Governmental Organizations (IGOs). As he declared war on Ukraine, Putin threatened dire consequences for “those who may be tempted to interfere in these developments from outside,” (The Kremlin, 2022).
The unresolved legal conflict about sovereignty and external sovereignty come from the opposing perspective of stakeholders in dispute. On the one hand, states view the concept of “sovereignty,” that is the right to govern and regulate their own internal affairs within their territories without interference, as absolute.
Powerful States like Russia lay claim to external sovereignty, that is the right to control political events within their sphere of influence. On the other hand, IGOs such as the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) believe that sovereignty is limited by the law of nature and international law (Garner, 1925).
It is true that the doctrine of absolutism of sovereignty held sway in the 19th and early 20th centuries in line with the spirit of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (Taulbee and Glahn, 2022). However, the devastation wrecked by Pearl harbor attack and destruction of Europe during World War Two (WWII), made the United States (US) to abandon its isolationist policy and embrace internationalist principles. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, once a vocal critic of President Franklin Roosevelt, was instrumental in the formation of NATO after he publicly renounced his isolationist principles and embraced internationalism (Vandenberg, 1945). The change in policy by the US and its Western allies, led to the formation of the UN and NATO, two IGOs that continue to play crucial roles in maintaining world peace, security and upholding humanitarian laws and norms.
Tellingly, Putin mentioned the UN, its organs and laws six times; NATO eleven times and the US thirteen times in his war declaration speech. NATO’s eastward expansion was one of the main reasons Putin advanced as drivers for the invasion of Ukraine: “I spoke about our biggest concerns and worries, and about the fundamental threats which irresponsible Western politicians created for Russia consistently —–. I am referring to the eastward expansion of NATO, which is moving its military infrastructure ever closer to the Russian border,” (Kremlin, 2022).
According to Putin, the US and its Western allies have used the podium of the UN to promote deceit and to destabilize the world for their selfish goals of control and containment of Russia. Instructively, Putin listed Syria, Libya, Belgrade and Iraq as examples of US-backed illegal interventions without UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions.
Also, Putin attempted to frame Russia’s war of aggression as self-defense based on Article 51of the UN Charter; and he offered Article 1 of the UN Charter which grants nations the legitimate right to self-determination as basis of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatist action in Eastern Ukrainian regions of Luhansk and Donetsk.
Reasons States Like Russia Violate International Law
Often, states choose the international laws to obey, while they shun other laws that hinder fulfilment of what they define as national interests. According to Morgenthau (1949), states define interest in terms of power. Similarly, Kenneth Waltz in his seminal work “Man, the State and War,” focuses on the anarchical structure of the world without overarching enforcement agent (Waltz, 1959). This makes the international political space turbulent and violent and power becomes a crucial factor in the survival of states. The concepts of classical and structural realism help to explain Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. For Putin, a Ukraine aligned with the European Union (EU) and NATO is a threat to Russia’s ability to project power in its Malorossiya (Little Russia) and must be resisted at all cost.
Also, Russia argue that basic international norms and laws adopted by post-WWII IGOs reflect the values and interests of the US and its Western allies “who declared themselves winners of the Cold war,” (The Kremlin, 2022).
Although Putin views secessionist aspirations of Donetsk and Luhansk in Eastern Ukraine as legitimate, and Russia has proceeded to recognize these separatist regions as states even though they do not fulfil the legal requirements of a state; nevertheless, Putin projects the legitimate aspirations of Chechens who constitute 96% of Chechnya as “a gangs of mercenaries and terrorists” supported by the West (The Kremlin, 2022). The key lesson from the double standard applied by Putin is that framing is very important in international relations and politics. For international law however, it is the cold facts that count.
Why International Law Matters and How It Applies to Russia’s Illegal Actions
International law creates order and the enabling environment that enhances cooperation among states on issues of common concern. Cooperation allows states to combine resources to tackle shared problems like terrorism, climate change or danger of ultra-nationalist governments.
Order creates the necessary environment for peace and progress among states. Indeed, in the years before the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and early years of Russia in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the US and its Western allies forged a close relationship with Moscow. For instance, in September 1990, Washington and Moscow issued joint statement condemning Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; in December 1990, President Bush extended $1 billion credit to Moscow to cushion food shortages and offered observer status for USSR with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
After the breakup of USSR, the US enacted a number of policies including Operation Provide Hope to support newly independent soviet states; in May 1997, President Clinton and Yeltsin signed the NATO – Russia Founding Act which affirmed that henceforth, NATO and Russia do not consider each other as foes; after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, Russia was one of the first states to reach out to Washington to offer support and in November, 2001, during a visit to Washington, Putin and President Bush announced their readiness to cooperate in the war against terrorism (U.S. Department of State Archive, 2009).
Instructively, the quest for collective security is one of the main mandates of the UN, exercised through the UNSC. By divesting states of some of their sovereign rights and investing it in the UNSC, the UN Charter combines Westphalian ideals of sovereignty with Wilsonian principles of internationalism through free trade, democracy and shared security (Taulbee and Glahn, 2022).
Four other importance of international law in shaping states’ behavior are: (1) Anxiety over retribution and retaliation through sanctions or superior force such as those legitimatized by UNSC mandate. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the UN, the EU, the US and other IGOs have placed different types of sanctions on Russia. Apart from economic sanctions, Russia is banned from global sporting and cultural events. Moscow’s lawless actions have effectively reduced Russia to a pariah state in the global community. Also, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant of arrest for Putin because of illegal transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia, a crime under article 8(2) of the Rome Statute (International Criminal Court, 2023). As a result, Putin was unable to attend BRICS summits in South Africa in 2023 and in Brazil in 2025 (Reuters, 2025).
Secondly, the treaty-making process of membership of IGOs like the UN involves the voluntary consent of states. Therefore, because Russia freely consented to the laws of the UN, its agreements and pronouncements are binding on Moscow. Since 2022, several UN General Assembly resolutions have overwhelmingly condemned Russia’s illegal action in Ukraine (Aljazeera, 2023; UN News, 2026). Although the paralysis of veto makes impactful action against Russia through the UNSC impossible, nevertheless, the economic squeeze due to Western sanctions is causing Moscow’s economy to convulse.
Thirdly, international law provides a framework for states to operate as rule-abiding international personalities, thereby enhancing their credibility and reputation. As stated earlier, in the years when Moscow cooperated with the US and its Western allies, Russia’s credibility and reputation was enhanced as Russia stood shoulder to shoulder with the US and other world leaders to proffer lasting solutions to common problems. One example is the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the US and Russia signed on January 31, 2002 to combat crime and terrorism (U.S Department of State Archive, 2009).
Fourthly, International law provides for “the Golden Rule of Sovereignty,” as enunciated by Emmerich de Vattel in his homily, The Law of Nations, which declares among other principles, that any state considering a violation of a rule of law must prepare to contend with reaction of other states (De Vattel, 1844). Currently, Russia is grappling with many unforeseen consequences of its aggressive war in Kiev, from loss of the over €20 billion Nord stream gas pipe lines to over 1.2 million casualties on the battlefield (Jones and McCabe, 2026).
In spite of the exhortation of several jurists through the ages, from Jean Bodin to Hugo Grotius, from Emmerich Vattel to Samuel von Pufendorf, on the need to embrace the tenets of the law of nations and international law, powerful states like Russia continue to pursue policies of aggression and subversion of the rights of smaller states and minorities within their territories.
Background to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
Russia and Ukraine share a long history, going back to the days of the Russian Romanov Czars and the USSR after the 1917 Revolution (BBC, 2003; Oldenbourg-Idalie, 2026). When the vast USSR was dissolved on December 25, 1991, fifteen republics emerged from the ruins as independent states, with Ukraine being the second largest state after Russia. Although it was Mikhail Gorbachev’s radical reformative policies of Perestroika – Restructuring and Glasnost – Openness that set in motion the chain reaction which caused the demise of the USSR, however, for Russian President Vladimir Putin, the main culprits are the US and its Western allies (BBC,2022; Brown, 2017).
When Putin came to power on December 31, 1991, after succeeding the ailing Boris Yeltsin, he cleverly concealed his animosity towards the West and pretended to embrace Western ideals of democracy, free speech and free market. According to Yaffa (2025), Putin at the inception of his reign stated that what Russia required is: “strengthen the state, the economy, and democratic institutions, including the free press.”
Using all his experience as a Colonel in Soviet Union’s elite spy organization, Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezpopasnosti (KGB), Putin successfully played the West along as Russia needed Western investment to shore up Moscow’s ailing economy. Soon, a steady foreign direct investment (FDI) increase from the West amounted to about $74.8 billion per annum and in 2008, the total value of FDI from the West stood at about $491 billion. Moscow’s GDP grew by about 94% within the same period (Ballard, 2018). Also, Europe depended almost entirely on Moscow for gas through the Nord Stream project.
As Putin completed his second term of four years in 2008 and with Russia on sound economic footing, he began to manifest increasingly hostile policies towards the West and autocratic policies at home. He stated that an oral agreement that NATO will not expand eastwards into former Soviet satellite states had been breached and there was a plan to bring Ukraine into the fold of the Western military alliance.
Putin who harbors a revanchist longing to recover the former Soviet empire, was referring to a statement made by former US Secretary of State James Baker to Soviet leader Gorbachev on February 9, 1990 (Savranskaya & Blanton, 2017).
The reasons Putin invaded Ukraine are summarized thus: Putin and Russian elites consider Ukraine and other former Soviet satellite states as Russia’s sphere of influence. When Boris Yeltsin supported the independence of Ukraine in 1991, he did so with the belief that Ukraine would remain closely aligned with Russia (Mankoff, 2022). Years later, Putin reechoed Yeltsin’s sentiment when he said Russia and Ukraine are “one people, a single whole.”
A second reason is Putin and Russian elites’ resentment for Ukraine’s alignment with Western ideals such as democracy and free trade, culminating in Ukraine’s desire to join the European Union and NATO. The instigators of Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, support for separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine and eventual invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 were the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005 which brought pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko to power in spite of efforts by the Kremlin to install Viktor Yanukovych and the Euromaidan Revolution of 2013-2014 that ousted Russia’s ally President Yanukovych, after he staged a return to power in 2010 (Karpyak, 2013; Dickinson, 2020). Yanukovych’s transgression was his decision to abandon a popular EU partnership package at the behest of Moscow (Traynor and Grytsenko, 2013). Eventually, he was forced to take refuge in Russia.
A third reason is Putin’s perception that the West is intentionally and increasingly relegating Russia to the background in geopolitical affairs. According to Wiegrefe (2025), in 1994, when NATO made the decision to allow former Warsaw Pact states into its fold, President Clinton considered inviting Russia to join the alliance in the hope of building what Clinton referred to as “a truly united, undivided, integrated Europe.” However, Clinton optimistic outlook was met with harsh pessimism by Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany and his officials who opined that such a move would cause the demise of NATO. Among many other concerns, they reminded Clinton that NATO was created to insure Europe against Russian aggression and instability. Putin remembered this slight.
Another reason for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the persona of Putin. Like Adolf Hitler, Putin had a difficult childhood growing up in a surrogate home. Putin’s harsh and loveless early life forged him into an untrusting, cynical and perpetually suspicious adult who is obsessed with power and control through fear. Like Hitler, Putin deploys the same salami-slicing tactics of taking possession of his opponent’s territory piecemeal. Finally, as Hitler was obsessed with the fate of Germany in World War I, so Putin is obsessed with the fate of Soviet Union (Çifci, 2025).
Legal Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
Putin provides both legal and political basis for his war of aggression. In his address announcing the “special military operation,” Putin states that “today’s Ukraine” represents an existential threat to Russia and proceeds to quote Article 51, Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the municipal authority of Russia’s Federation Council, and the letters of military treaty with Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic, as legal justifications for his action.
Although Putin attempts to provide legal backing for his action by positioning the invasion as an act of self-defense, but the reality is that Russia is the aggressor attempting to possess another state’s territory through force. This is a violation of international law as stated in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and backed by UNSC resolutions 242 adopted in 1967 and 298 passed in 1971 which makes it illegal for any state to seize, annex or redraw the boundaries of another state through force (University of Minnesota, 2023). For this reason, the occupied territories by Israel in the Middle East are not recognized by the UN.
Also, Crimea annexed in 2014 is not recognized by the UN as Russia’s legitimate territory and neither does the UN recognize the separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as sovereign states. Under international law, these regions are considered part of Ukraine.
Secondly, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine violates the Budapest Memorandum signed on December 5, 1994, when Putin beguiled President Clinton, his French and British counterparts to accede to the treaty that allowed Ukraine and two other former Soviet Republics, Belarus and Kazakhstan to give up their nuclear weapons in return for security guarantee from all permanent members of the UNSC (the P5).
For emphasis, Ukraine had the third highest stockpile of nuclear weapons and President Clinton reiterated at the time the security guarantees from the P5 represent their collective commitment to “the independence, the sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of these states,” (Adams, 2022). More than two decades later the “security assurances” of President Clinton sound hollow in the light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This reinforces the words of Thomas Hobbes that treaties without the necessary superior force to compel compliance are “mere words.”
Also, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine violates the Declaration on Principles of International Law (1970) adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) which states inter alia “The principle that States shall refrain in their international-relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,” (University of Minnesota, 2023).
Coincidentally, the UNSC was deliberating over the Russia – Ukraine crisis when Putin announced the start of Moscow’s invasion of Kiev. Although the invasion was a rude shock for internationalists like UN Secretary General, António Guterres, US Ambassador to the UN under President Biden, Linda Thomas-Greenfield; for realists like John Mearsheimer, and Jeffrey Sachs, Putin’s action was predictable and expected (Sachs, 2023).
Conclusion
Although realists side with Putin and claim that NATO’s eastward expansion is responsible for Russia’s action and they proceeded to put the blame for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the US and its Western allies; however, recent demands by Russia during mediation of the crisis by President Trump’s administration has shown that complete annexation of Ukraine is the objective of Russia (Mearsheimer, 2014; Sachs, 2023). Ukraine has offered to abandon it ambition of joining NATO in return for security assurances to end the war (Ellyatt, 2025), yet Russia insist on keeping Ukrainian territories, including regions yet to be conquered and demilitarization of Kiev by reducing its armed forces from 250,000 to about 50,000 (Dickinson, 2025).
Ukrainians has shown outstanding courage fighting to keep their country for four years, much to the dismay of Putin who predicted at the start of the war that Ukrainians would roll over and surrender to the might of Russia.
Instead, the invasion has ruined Russia’s economy and reputation. In 2024, the Central Asia – Caucasus Institute published the predictions of 26 experts about the future of Russia. Nearly all the determinists painted a grim picture of Moscow’s future (Central Asia – Caucasus Institute, 2024).
The ongoing war between the US/Israel against Iran may have offered Moscow a lifeline after US relaxed sanctions on Russian oil in order to cushion rising global oil prices, nevertheless, Kiev countered by increasing strikes on Russia’s oil infrastructure and managed to knock off $1 billion from Moscow’s oil revenue during the war (Adler, 2026).
Also, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine is taking advantage of the war to market Kiev’s war-time technology to rich Middle East countries and EU members. Ukraine boosts that Iranian Shahed drones which Moscow utilizes against Ukrainian cities can be intercepted with systems costing about $10,000. This is a huge cost-saving innovation compared to American traditional air defense systems such the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) system which cost several millions of dollars. Consequently, Ukraine has signed security cooperation deals with EU members like Norway and Germany (Adler, 2026). Ultimately, while Ukraine’s resilience and innovation is worthy of commendation, Kiev’s efforts need to be complemented by concerted and sustained economic pressure by the US and its Western allies in order to bring Russia to the negotiation table to end the war on just terms.
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