Abstract
Scientists are yet to invent a crystal ball that will accurately predict the future. However, this paper relies on antecedents, current trends, PESTLE – based analysis, qualitative exploratory methodology grounded in structural analysis, SWOT evaluation (focused exclusively on external Opportunities and Threats), and disruption-based scenario planning,to make informed forecasts about Russia in 2035.
Russia, is plagued by many ills, economic, political, sociocultural, technological, and others. Many of Russia’s current woes are tied to Putin’s ill-conceived decision to invade Ukraine. Russia’s aging and depleted population often demonstrate political apathy and learned inertia due to high cost of civil disobedience.
As Western sanctions bite and the war in Ukraine rages on, the post-Soviet era hegemonic elasticity which Russia enjoyed for more than a decade have been eroded as the main pillars of Moscow’s might, security depth, geographical gatekeeping, surplus oil and gas reserves are squeezed simultaneously.
Experts’ diagnoses of Russia’s malady are grim. Russia will not disappear as a major Eurasian actor due to enduring assets such as nuclear deterrence, energy capacity and sprawling geographical territory, however, structural constraints due mainly to Western sanctions and the enormous cost of prosecuting the war will place Moscow in a perilous position by 2035.
Key Words: Russia, Forecasts, Putin, SWOT, PESTLE.
Introduction
Russia’s political, sociocultural, technological, economic fortunes and future are tied to a number of intricate and closely connected issues that converge around the outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the individual-level analysis of Russian leader, Vladimir Putin.
Until the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russia was a member of the G-8; Russia attended and was a prominent voice at the annual Munich Security Conference (MSC); Russia’s Nord Stream pipelines to Germany pumped oil from Moscow into Berlin and the rest of the European Union (EU) like arteries pumping blood to the heart. Russia’s technology was on the rise due to Western influence and Moscow’s population and society were stable.
Contrary to the thinking of classical analysts who emphasize that the key to achieving power in an anarchical international system is military capability, economic capacity, and political authority (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001), Russia, since the days of the Soviet Union, understood that in the global system, technological capacity is one of the primary drivers of states’ geopolitical influence.
Consequently, Russia’s technological development has been an essential component of Moscow’s pursuit of strategic hegemonic dominance.
The proof of this is visible from Soviet Union’s advancements in nuclear engineering and space exploration (including the first successful launch of Sputnik in 1957), to current investments in artificial intelligence, Arctic infrastructure, and satellite navigation systems. Technology has served as both a symbol of national power and a mechanism for securing strategic autonomy from other competing powers (Graham, 1993; NASA, n.d.).
Even after the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia retained significant capabilities in strategic sectors such as nuclear energy, aerospace engineering and military-industrial production. But Soviet Union’s technological advancement would not have been possible without crucial inputs and components derived from the West thanks to communist Moscow’s extensive spy network. For example, Soviet spies successfully infiltrated Robert Oppenheimer’s nuclear project in Los Alamos, New Mexico in the 1940s. In the ensuing nuclear race, the Soviet Union acquitted itself adequately against the U.S. In recent history, Russia leveraged on years of cooperation with the West for rapid advancement of its technology in areas such as artificial intelligence, satellite systems, cyber capabilities, and digital infrastructure.
Not anymore. Not since the early morning invasion four years ago which Putin tagged “military operation,” meant to” de-Nazify” Ukraine and halt the “genocide” of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the eastern part of Kiev (Paris-AFP, 2023). Consequently, Russia’s choice for confrontation with the West instead of continued cooperation has impeded Moscow’s stability in many ways. The question is no longer whether Russia remains powerful, but whether it can continue to function as the central organizing force of Eurasia through 2035.
For three decades, Russia’s regional influence rested on three interlocking pillars. First, security depth allowed Moscow to project power across Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia
while deterring external encroachment. Second, transit centrality enabled Russia to act as the primary land bridge between Asia and Europe, converting geography into economic and political leverage. Third, energy diplomacy provided a powerful instrument of influence, allowing Moscow to shape political alignments through hydrocarbon dependence.
Also, Russia’s sociocultural landscape has been affected in at least three distinct ways: (1) It created urbanization patterns and regional population imbalances which has implications for Russia’s social and economic stability by 2035; (2) it created generational value shifts among younger Russians which may influence political and economic direction by 2035; and (3) it points to possibilities that Russia’s historical political culture (centralized authority and strong leadership traditions) may shape readiness for democratic or institutional reform by 2035 (UN DESA, 2024; WHO, n.d.; World Bank, 2017; Freedom House, 2025; Human Rights Watch, 2025).
Russia also suffered technological, political and economic drawbacks. First for the annexation of Crimea, Russia was kicked out of the G-8 in 2014 after the White House said: “International law prohibits the acquisition of part or all of another state’s territory through coercion or force,” in fact, a meeting of G-8 billed for Sochi in Russia in 2014 was called off (Acosta, 2014). Russia was not invited to attend the 59th MSC in 2022 after the invasion of Ukraine. It marked the first time Russia would be absent from the world’s leading security summit after being a regular participant since 1999 (Interfax, 2022; Morodowanec, 2022). Nord Stream I and II gas pipelines constructed at combined cost of about €20 billion were blown up in September 2022 bringing huge economic loss and ecological devastation in the Baltic sea.
Furthermore, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has halted its technological trajectory due to growing geopolitical rivalries, sanctions regimes, and evolving models of technological competition. Increased restrictions on Russia’s access to advanced semiconductors and global innovation networks have amplified the Russian government’s focus on technological sovereignty and state-led innovation (Connolly, 2018).
As if that was not enough, many Russian banks were suspended from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), further economically isolating Russia (Perez, 2022).
Although these measures are not intended to engineer Russia’s collapse, they have restricted Russia’s ability to maneuver and project power across Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Although Moscow retains nuclear deterrence, vast territory, energy resources, and consolidated state institutions, yet the mechanisms through which it previously translated these assets into uncontested regional leadership are becoming more competitive and contested. So, as 2035 approaches, these are just a few strands in the multilayered and knotty issues that could spell doom or spring forth revival for Russia, the West and the world in the coming decade.
Experts’ Review
In 2024, the Central Asia – Caucasus Institute published the predictions of 26 experts about the future of Russia. Nearly all the determinists painted a grim picture of the future of Russia. Experts’ opinion and contemporary literature cluster around four interrelated themes: (1) sanctions resilience and economic sustainability, (2) regional geopolitics and connectivity competition, (3) China’s expanding role in Central Asia, (4) systemic risk in an emerging multipolar order, (5) mechanisms for managing religious and ethnic conflicts occasioned by changing population demographics, (6) managing the downside of the militarization of Russia’s civilian population due to large number of veterans of the Ukraine war and (7) the prospects of BRICS adequately substituting for the loss of trade and political platforms from the West.
Russia will Continue to Project Strengths in the face of Sanctions
One of the long-term effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the resulting sanctions is that Putin’s administration will increase its nationalist/patriotic fervor built around the “Uraa (Ypá)” mantra to increase internal cohesion. Introduced in the days of the imperialist Russian Red Army to signify one strong, unified Russia, this military chant will now be domesticated within the civilian population to increase their combative posture and hostility towards the West.
As a domestic policy, Russians will be encouraged to openly display their nationalist or patriotic leanings and many citizens would be rewarded for spying on their compatriots and for identifying “foreign agents.”
This police state scenario is reminiscent of the old Soviet era and it will be increasingly reenacted as Russia moves towards 2035 with Putin as the head of the Kremlin.
Although information about the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is treated as state secret, however, it is public knowledge that in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine, the number of employees, the scope of operation and salaries of personnel of the FSB have increased exponentially. Entry level salaries went up from $2500 in 2022 to $5200 in 2024. Yet there are many perks to being in the good books of the establishment. It guarantees regular promotions and postings to choice units (Kluge, 2026). As more Russians take up employment in the FSB and other clandestine security services, Putin’s regime net over free speech and other forms of protest will widen.
However, in spite of the crackdown on civil liberties, political fissures within Russia are expanding as many among the almost 200 minority ethnic groups in Russia such as Buryatia in Eastern Siberia, Dagestan in North Caucasus, Turkic tribe in Sakha-Yakutia Republic, Northeast Siberia and others have suffered disproportionately high casualty figures from the war in Ukraine compared to mainstream Russian ethnic groups in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Novosibirsk and others (Arnold, 2024). Figures from BBC Russian and Mediazona say 67% of the Russia’s death toll are from minority tribes and rural areas. Moscow has the least death, 0.05% (Ivshina, 2026).
With Russia experiencing rapidly decreasing population due to high casualty figures from the war in Ukraine, low birth rate, low life expectancy and high population flight, these problems will become more pronounced and terminal.
Russia will Weaponize state security as pretense to strangle civil liberties
At the start of the war in 2022, Russia passed three laws with regards to the war: (1) Public Actions Discrediting Russian Armed Forces; (2) Calling for Sanctions against Russia; and (3) False information about Russian Armed Forces. Those laws have since been expanded.
Presently, all means of communication are controlled and monitored by the Russian state to ensure that Russians are not exposed or influenced by “foreign agents.” Recently, Russia blocked US-based WhatsApp messaging platform over what Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov termed “reluctance to comply with the norms and letter of Russian law,” (Al Jazeera Staff, 2026). As alternative, Russia has directed its citizens to turn to state-promoted social media platform MAX. In a related development, in 2025, Russia began curbing communication over Telegram after accusing the platform of refusing to share information with law enforcement agents.
According to a UN Human Rights special report, the number of persons prosecuted for treason-related offences have gone from two digits in 2022 to nearly a 1000 verdicts in 2025; cases involving espionage went from five in 2022 to 159 in 2025; more than five terrorism-related sentences were handed out per day in 2025; and the list of terrorists and extremists rose from 1600 in 2022 to more than 18,000 in 2025 (Katzarova, 2025). In the coming decade, Russia will continue to exploit national security and public safety laws to strangle civil liberties at home as Putin’s regime moves from autocratism to totalitarianism.
The Erasure of NGOs by the Russian State Reduces the Prospect for Revival of Democracy
Since 2012, when Putin began his third term in office, the Russian state has made it a domestic policy to closely monitor the activities of Non-Governmental Organizations, journalists and civil liberty groups. There is indeed a stark contrast between Russia in the early 2000s when it was embraced by the West and todays’ internationally-isolated Russia. In 2000, Putin affirmed his commitment to a reformed and open Russia by outlining what needs to be done: “Strengthen the state, the economy, and democratic institutions, including free press,” (Yaffa, 2025). In the following one and a half decade, Putin’s determination to rid Russia of independent-minded journalists, civil societies and NGOs have strongly constrained Russia’s ability to rebuild its battered democratic institutions.
Freedom House’s assessment classifies Russia as “Not Free,” reflecting restrictions on political rights and civil liberties that limit independent participation and accountability mechanisms (Freedom House, 2025). Human Rights Watch documents the continued expansion and application of “foreign agent” and “undesirable organizations” frameworks targeting media and civil society, suggesting sustained legal and administrative pressure on independent civic activity (Human Rights Watch, 2025). OHCHR reporting in late 2025 describes intensifying measures against human-rights defenders and anti-war voices as part of broader repression, indicating structural constraints on civil-society viability and rule-of-law conditions (OHCHR, 2025). These conditions matter because constrained civic space can weaken feedback loops and reduce independent expertise circulation, which can reduce societal problem-solving capacity while increasing reputational friction in rights-based international fora (Freedom House, 2025; Human Rights Watch, 2025; OHCHR, 2025).
There will be Aggregation of Dissenting Voices from Abroad
Russia – Ukraine war-era dynamics reinforce the relevance of this sociocultural baseline. Post-2022 mobility and diaspora formation represent comparatively fast-moving dynamics interacting with slower aging and health constraints, and the degree of civic restriction shapes how societies absorb shocks and whether skilled cohorts remain embedded in domestic opportunity structures (Krawatzek & Sasse, 2024; UN DESA, 2024; Freedom House, 2025). For forecasting, the baseline therefore implies that Russia’s 2035 sociocultural outlook will be strongly conditioned by the interaction between slow-moving structural variables – aging, health capacity, spatial disparity and fast-moving uncertainty variables – mobility, legitimacy dynamics, civic space constraints) (UN DESA, 2024; WHO, n.d.; World Bank, 2017; Krawatzek & Sasse, 2024).
More than one million Russians have escaped abroad since 2022 to neighboring countries like Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkey, Armenia and other parts of Europe (Zavadskaya, 2023).
Many of Russia’s population in the diaspora oppose the war and some Russian soldiers who escaped from the warfront to the West have published their gory experiences detailing how Russian commanders liquidate members of their squad for disobeying orders that border on suicide and how Russian soldiers are used as “meat storms” to wear down Ukrainians (Steele et al, 2026). On the domestic front, the Russian government is making efforts to close the exit door against those who are eligible for military duty and on the foreign scene the government is pushing for repatriation of people with Russian/Soviet ancestry to boost flagging population. Also, in 2026, Moscow expanded the “Foreign Agent” laws and trials in-absentia to target Russians abroad. Assets of Russians abroad who protest against the war have been seized and demands made by the Russian state to have these protesters repatriated.
Ultimate Test for Putin’s Realism Against the West’s Liberalism
Putin is a classical realist who supports the old tenet of powerful states: “What is mine is mine and what is yours is negotiable.” Putin wants Ukraine to hand over the entire Donbas region, including the territories that are yet to be captured; he demands a scaling down of Ukrainian armed forces and a halt to supply of Western weapons.
In fact, Putin wants Ukraine to be a vassal state of Russia. Anything less is unacceptable because the Russian leader believes Moscow is locked in an existential war with the West on Ukrainian territory. Putin blames the West for the demise of the Soviet Union and believes that the West with its promise of liberal ideals set Soviet Union up for collapse.
For these and other reasons, he is determined not to trust the West again and views Brussels and Washington increasingly with suspicion. So long as Putin remains in power, the war in Ukraine will grind on at enormous human, political and economic costs (Kolesnikov, 2026; Stanovaya, 2026).
So as domestic policy, Moscow will continue to project strength at home to increase internal support for Putin’s administration. Russia’s greatest political strength is its nuclear capabilities. Moscow has the world’s largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, about 5600 nuclear warheads. Any attempt to confront Russia frontally, militarily by the West is bound to produce Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). This security assurance against foreign invasion will be projected by the Russian state propaganda machine at home to give Russians a sense of invincibility. In turn, Russians will be expected to demonstrate gratitude for this “security umbrella” by openly supporting Putin’s administration and confronting its critics.
Russia will Jettison Norms and Embrace Impunity
Furthermore, as a domestic policy, Russia will encourage its citizens to increase the cost of war on Ukraine and the West, using every means and any means. “All is fair in war” will be the rallying cry in Moscow. The objective is to win the war and achieve all of Russia’s war aims.
In 2025, while attending a military parade in China, Putin reiterated that Russia will achieve all its war goals in Ukraine, militarily (Kola, 2025). As 2035 approaches, Russians would be reminded and nudged to realize these military goals.
On the foreign scene, the nuclear umbrella provides security assurance for Moscow and imposes a heightened sense of caution on Washington and its allies.Also, it allows Russia to increase the cost of war on Ukraine and its supporters. For instance, in 2022, for more than two years into the war, Biden’s administration refused to let Ukraine use U.S.-supplied Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) outside Kiev’s borders because such a move could lead to escalation; within the same time, the Russian army targeted civilians and committed what many international observers regarded as war crimes in Ukrainian cities like Bucha, Volnovakha, Mariupol and others (Scheffer, 2022). As 2035 draws nearer, Russia will remain uncompromising about its untenable demands on Ukraine, however, the West, especially the EU, will be resolute in ensuring that just peace is achieved in Kiev, the contrasting positions of the antagonists would result in a deadlock. Russians would in turn unleash their frustration on Ukrainians in occupied cities. Over the coming years, Russian occupation army will become numb and unfeeling about crimes against humanity and its legal consequences.
Russia will turn more to BRICS for Survival and to cushion West Sanctions
Russia has deepened its economic relationship with BRICS member, especially China because of Western sanctions and Trump’s tariff. In 2021, the year before the invasion, Russia’s trade volume with China amounted to $147 billion, while trade between Russia and the entire BRICS countries within the same period stood at $164 billion (Kumar et al, 2024).
Russia’s trade with the European Union in 2021 stood at €257.5 billion. In 2024, Russia’s trade with the EU decreased to €67.5 billion, while trade between Moscow and China increased to $244.8 billion; trade between Russia and the BRICS countries in 2024 amounted to $300 billion.
The implication of this is that in terms of sheer trade volume, China, which accounts for more than two-third of Russia’s trade within BRICS and 35% of Moscow’s global trade is capable of substituting for Europe.
Yet, in terms to product innovation and technical advancement, the EU has a cutting edge. Indeed, a significant body of research points to Russia’s economic adaptation under sanctions. Early assessments emphasized macroeconomic stabilization mechanisms, including capital controls, currency management, and fiscal reserves, which helped buffer initial shocks (IMF, 2026). More recent analyses argue that while Russia has demonstrated resilience, long-term sustainability remains uncertain. Chatham House (2025) highlights the risks of technological isolation and constrained capital access, suggesting that adaptation may preserve stability but limit modernization.
Laruelle (2023) introduces the concept of defense-led economic restructuring, arguing that sustained military mobilization can temporarily support output while distorting long-term development trajectories. This debate reflects a broader question within international political economy: can a sanctions-adapted economy maintain sufficient growth and innovation to support regional leadership? While Russia has avoided collapse, scholars increasingly note that resilience does not automatically translate into hegemonic capacity and growth sustainability.
China’s Expanding Economic Footprint in Central Asia
China’s rise in Central Asia represents another major debate. Some scholars describe emerging patterns as cooperative alignment or “co-hegemony,” wherein Russia maintains security primacy while China dominates economically. Others argue that economic asymmetry gradually reorders regional hierarchies. Russia has a GDP and population that represent one-tenth of China’s capacity. No wonder, Hiroyuki Akita, a Nikkei commentator on foreign and international security predicted that Russia could become a “satellite state” of China; a phenomenon he termed “North Koreanization” of Russia, a military giant incapable of sustaining itself (Central Asia – Caucasus Institute, 2024).
Energy partnerships between Russia and China further complicate this relationship (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2026). While energy interdependence stabilizes bilateral ties, it may deepen structural asymmetry if Russia becomes increasingly reliant on Chinese markets and capital. This debate intersects with broader discussions of multipolarity and whether Russia can preserve strategic autonomy within an evolving Sino-centric Eurasian system.
Hegemony, power, and technological capacity
Recent scholarship emphasizes the concept of technological sovereignty, with the idea that a state can design, control, and use its own technology independently without depending on other external systems (Weiss, 2014). This concept implies that a state’s technological self-sufficiency is an important measure of geopolitical power in today’s world.
Another way to understand how countries seek technological independence is through the lens of techno-nationalism. Techno-nationalism describes the use of government policy to encourage technological innovation to achieve a nation’s strategic goals (Breznitz, 2007). Government investment in domestic research capability, protection of key sectors of the economy, and coordination of technological development are all ways in which governments attempt to strengthen their national security and economic competitiveness.
In Russia, technological sovereignty, motivated by mistrust of the West and its technology, is rapidly evolving into a matter of national strategic need and regime security approach. As part of broader measures to promote technological self-sufficiency, Russia’s information technology companies are granted generous tax rebates, and information technology workers are exempted from conscription for military duty in Ukraine (Sherman, 2024).
The state-centric model of technological innovation in Russia
The contemporary Russian approach to developing its own technological strategy has been influenced by historical factors established during the Soviet regime. To build a strong capability in aerospace engineering, nuclear energy, and military technology, the Soviet Union invested in technology and science through central planning (Graham, 1993). As a result, scientific research became closely related to national security goals, and there was a close relationship between technological development and competition for geopolitical status.
Although the collapse of the Soviet Union had a negative effect on many aspects of the economy, Russia maintained a strong base of technological capabilities in certain critical sectors, especially in nuclear engineering, defense manufacturing, and space technology (Connolly, 2018). However, the broader civilian innovation system did not develop equally well in Russia during the transition from the Soviet Union to modern times.
Modern initiatives such as the GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite System) represent one of the ways in which Russia seeks to strengthen domestic innovation capacity. GLONASS allows Russia to have its own satellite-based navigation system, thus providing it with independence from other countries’ satellite-based navigation systems. The Skolkovo Innovation Centre is another initiative to promote innovation and entrepreneurship in new areas of research. However, despite these two initiatives, scholars have indicated that Russia’s innovation system still has structural problems, including inadequate private sector funding of innovation and limited opportunities for interaction with global research communities (Connolly, 2018).
Conclusion
Putin’s ill-conceived decision to invade Ukraine will certainly influence the future of Russia in ways that will outlive Putin and the current actors in Russia. The effects of the war will make Russia weaker economically, politically, socioculturally, technologically and cause Moscow to be more dependent on China and less capable to project power globally and within the Eurasia region.
The return of large number of veterans from the Ukraine war to Russia, especially those from minority tribes will create unrest and fuel separatist movements. There is also the possibility of religious conflicts between Russia’s dominant, yet diminishing numbers of Protestant Church Christians and the marginalized but growing numbers of Muslims in North Caucasus.
On the foreign scene, the land/lease territory arrangement between Russia and China will become a source of conflict between Beijing and Moscow after Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have left the stage. China with its huge population could easily supplant Russia’s dwindling population in Moscow’s far East and make good current fears of future annexation.
From all indications, Putin like Brezhnev, with his corrupt and unyielding antidemocratic ideology, has set Russia up for stagnation, decay and decapitation.
Paper produced by: “Team Eurasia” – Boa-yin Leung, Agnés Nyaga, Haile Kirubel, Soni Gold
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