Political leaders sometimes resort to deception as a communication strategy for different reasons. In Nigeria, several violations of the social contract by different administrations and regimes have eroded government’s social capital. Consequently, citizens view government actions and policies with suspicion. General Babangida, after eight years of military rule that promised much and delivered little, was determined to remain in power beyond the promised handover date. However, after banning and unbanning several politicians, Babangida grudgingly allowed presidential election to take place on June 12, 1993. The free and fair rating of the election by local and international observers robbed Babangida of legitimate reasons for annulling the election. Therefore, he fell back on a tested and trusted old habit, deception. The speech that annulled June 12 Presidential Election has all the characteristics of a message designed to deceive. These attributes include falsification, verbosity, equivocation, futuristic and superficial promises. Knowledge of these elements will help receivers to identify and respond appropriately to deceptive messages.
Key words: Deception, June 12 presidential election, Babangida, Democracy, Communication strategy.
Introduction
Context is a very important element of communication. This is because “shared meaning” derived in any communication exchange is conveyed by both words and context of communication, such as background of sender and receiver, prevailing culture, and channel of communication (Muyanga and Phiri, 2021). This is even more relevant in high context communication which is common among Africans. It is for this reason that a background to the speech that annulled June 12 Presidential Election is provided, beginning with the entry of the military into governance in 1966.
Background to long years of Military Rule in Nigeria
Nigeria was barely six years when a bloody military coup truncated its first civilian administration on January 15, 1966. The civil administration led by Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa in the First Republic (October 1, 1960 – January 15, 1966), suffered from intra and interparty conflicts and was alleged to be corrupt (Janguza, 2017). From 1962, the administration went from one crisis to another, namely: (1) Intraparty conflict within the federal opposition party, the Action Group (AG), between party leader, Obafemi Awolowo and his deputy, Ladoke Akintola; (2) further polarization caused by hotly contested and cancelled 1962 census.
Also, rerun census in 1963 was marred by struggle for ethnic and political dominance between ruling Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC), National Convention of Nigerian Citizens and AG; (3) workers’ union general strike of 1963 that threatened to derail celebrations for independence on October 1, 1963 (Haruna et al, 2023; Janguza, 2017) and (4) hotly disputed 1964 general election that brought Nigeria to the brink of disintegration (McKenna, 1969).
January 15 Coupists & General Aguyi-Ironsi
Nigerians received news of change of government with mixed feelings. Many in Southwest were happy that the corrupt administration was ousted. However, many in the North were suspicious and angry when the identities of the coupists were revealed.
The coup plotters were mainly: (1) middle-ranked, British-trained officers; (2) Igbos, a major ethnic group in Southeast Nigeria; (3) Christians. Also, political leaders assassinated during the coup were mainly Hausas, from the North.
Moreover, General Aguyi-Ironsi, who quelled the coup and assumed position of Head of State was an Igbo man. Therefore, the January 15, 1966 coup was termed an “Igbo Coup.” Six months later, on July 29, 1966, Aguyi-Ironsi was assassinated in a counter coup led by soldiers of Northern extraction (Akinbode, 2019; McKenna, 1969; Siollun, 2016).
General Gowon – The Longest Military Regime in Nigeria
This marked the beginning of General Yakubu Gowon’s nine-year reign as Head of State, from 1966 until 1975 when he was also overthrown, however, this time, in a bloodless palace coup that ushered in General Muritala Muhammed.
Gowon was accused of highhandedness by his contemporaries, and his regime was deemed corrupt. Gowon failed to curb corrupt practices of his subordinates. Nevertheless, the greatest allegation against Gowon’s administration was failure to honor his pledge made on October 1, 1970, to hand over to civilian administration by 1976 (Akinbode, 2025; Teniola, 2025).
General Muritala Mohammed & the 1st Palace Coup
Barely one year after, Muritala was assassinated on February 13, 1976, in an unsuccessful military coup and his deputy, General Obasanjo stepped in before handing over to elected civilians on October 1, 1979 (Aiyejina, 2020). This marked the beginning of the Second Republic headed by President Shehu Shagari.
The 2nd Republic & Return of Military Rule
The civilian administration lasted only one election cycle before the military, led by General Buhari, returned to power few months after Shagari began his second term in 1983. Again, the allegation for sacking Shagari’s government was corruption and many political leaders of that era were tried by military tribunals and sentenced to long jail terms. It is not surprising that one of the main policies of Buhari’s reign was War Against Indiscipline (WAI) campaign (Sil, 2023).
General Buhari’s Regime & Human Rights Violations
One of the characteristics of military regimes is suspension of civil constitution and promulgation of decrees that often breech fundamental rights of citizens. This was evident in Nigeria and Buhari’s regime was notorious for promulgating many draconian decrees such as Decree No 2, that gave government power to detain persons considered to have contributed to economic setback or posed a threat to state security. Also, there was Decree No 4 that prescribed jail term for anyone who published material capable of causing distress to the state, or public officer. Essentially, Decree No 4 was promulgated to gag the press and two notable journalists, Tunde Thompson and Nduka Irabor, were convicted by military tribunals at the time (Daka, 2017).
More worrisome for human rights community and social commentators was retroactive application of Decrees 4 and 20. The latter prescribed death penalty for oil bunkering and drug peddling (Ajayi, 2025). Three Nigerians, Bartholomew Owoh, Razaq Ojuolape and Bernard Ogedengbe were condemned to death and executed for drug offences committed before Decree 20 was promulgated.
“President” Babangida – The Maradona
It was in this oppressive setting that General Ibrahim Babangida staged a palace coup on August 27, 1985. In his speech announcing reasons for the coup, Babangida, who was Chief of Army Staff under Buhari, mentioned several missteps of Buhari’s regime, especially human rights violations and oppressive economic policies. Babangida positioned his regime as an interventionist administration and promised Nigerians a more humane and inclusive government (Akinbode, 2025).
Contrary to his promise, Babangida’s regime was just as brutal and oppressive as Buhari’s regime. Under Babangida, in 1986, a prominent investigative journalist, Dele Giwa was assassinated by letter bomb. It was the first of its kind in Nigeria and many social commentators pointed fingers at state security operatives (BBC, 2017; Premium Times, 2015).
Also, Babangida’s economic policies, particularly International Monetary Fund/Word Bank – advised Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) caused severe hardship and unrest across the country as the local currency, Naira was devalued and inflation rose from 5.4% in 1986 to 40.9% in 1989 (Anyanwu, 1992). Babangida responded to protests by proscribing trade unions and closing down universities (Britannica Editors, 2025).
The Unending Transition to Civil Rule Program
More troubling however, was Babangida’s unending transition to civil rule program. Babangida earned the unflattering appellations of “Evil Genius” and “Maradona,” for constantly shifting and altering the transition program that was to culminate in election of a civilian president. Beginning in 1986, the initial date for conclusion of the transition program was 1990, then it was changed to 1992, before finally agreeing on August 27, 1993 as exit date for the military (Akinbode, 2021; Britannica Editors, 2025).
When it finally commenced, the transition program was staggered with gubernatorial and elections to legislative houses settled in 1991. However, the process for electing a president was full of manipulations, intrigue, and suspense.
The electioneering process was tightly controlled by the military government. Babangida regime: (1) created and funded two political parties contesting the elections, namely: the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention (NRC); (2) created the National Electoral Commission (NEC), the agency tasked with organizing elections and appointed its chairperson, Professor Humphrey Nwosu; (3) created the Center for Democratic Studies (CDS) and appointed its Director General, to create a structure for the transition program and to serve in advisory capacity to both the political parties and government and (4) established a social orientation agency called Mass Mobilization for Social and Economic Recovery (MAMSER) to propagate democratic values among Nigerians (Akinbode, 2022; Vanguard, 2012).
In 1992, many presidential candidates from both SDP and NRC, who took part in party primaries, were banned on allegations of vote-buying and other antidemocratic behaviors. They were later unbanned and banned again. Also, the timetable for elections was changed several times (Teniola, 2019).
The hardline position of the regime frustrated many presidential aspirants, and some wondered if Babangida was willing to conclude the transition program and hand over to civilian government.
June 12, 1993 Presidential Election
Eventually, after so much chopping and changing, the two political parties, NRC and SDP held their primaries in March 1993, and produced presidential flagbearers that were seemingly acceptable to Babangida’s regime, (Akinbode, 2022).
Moshood Abiola, a business man and ally of Babangida became flagbearer of SDP, while Bashir Tofa, also a business man, got NRC’s ticket. In a country polarized by ethnic and religious sentiments, both candidates were Muslims, but while Abiola was from Southwest, Tofa hailed from Northwest. Surprisingly, this did not seem to matter to Nigerians, even the fact that Abiola picked another Muslim, Babagana Kingibe as running mate.
However, the nefarious activities of an obscure group called Association for a Better Nigeria (ABN) proved to be of greater concern. The group which Nigerians suspected was sponsored by government, launched media campaigns requesting Babangida to remain in power and sought legal grounds to scuttle the presidential election (Akinbode, 2021; IRB, 1994).
Despite ABN’s efforts, the presidential election took place on June 12, 1993 and although registered voters’ turnout was low (about 30%), it was adjudged by both local and international observers to be free and fair. (CRP and CLO, 1998; Ibrahim, 2018). NEC had already posted results from 15 out of the 30 states, and Abiola was leading, when Babangida annulled the election and dissolved NEC on June 23, 1993 (Akinbode, 2021).
Analyzing June 12 Election Annulment Speech Using Speech Act Theory
The speech, made up of 2856 words was disingenuously long. This paper examined the content of the speech under three elements of the Speech Act Theory put forward by British philosopher and linguist, John Langshaw Austin, namely: locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary attributes (Sejati et al, 2024).
The locutionary qualities relate to the basic task of articulating words which express literal meanings. This has certain similarities with low context communication. The illocutionary aspects of the speech pertain to the objective of the speaker which is not accessible through denotative meaning of the words. This is similar to high context communication where the receiver is expected to “read between the lines” to obtain meaning. The perlocutionary qualities concern the effect of the message on the receiver. As knowledge, social system and culture of the source (Babangida) and the receiver (Nigerian citizens) are similar in this context, Nigerians could detect true intention of the speech and react appropriately (Muyanga and Phiri, 2021).
The language used is generally accessible. However, 629 words, nearly a quarter of the message is devoted to expressing shared “profound sense of disappointment at the outcome” of the election and extensive self-adulation for laying “sound and justifiable policies and programmes of reform, and foundation for “self-reliant economic development and social justice,” (Odunsi, 2017, para 2, 4).
Although the speech listed five criteria necessary for satisfactory democracy which the source claimed were absent during June 12 election, it took 1101 words to get to this point. According to the speech, five minimum requirements for acceptable election and democracy are: (1) Free and fair elections; (2) freewill expression of voters’ preference; (3) respect for electorate as unhindered final arbiter on elections; (4) decorum and fairness on the part of the electoral umpires; and (5) absolute respect for the rule of law (Odunsi, 2017).
The speech blamed the following groups for annulled: (1) the presidential candidates for vote- buying and “other acts of bad conduct”; (2) party agents; (3) officials of NEC; (4) the judiciary for bending to the whims of “vested interests,” and (5) foreign governments for attempting to dictate to Nigeria how to run its democracy (Odunsi, 2017). Everyone was blamed except the regime that nurtured the transition process and aborted it at maturity.
Analyzing Deception as a Communication Strategy
Although the words used are accessible to the average Nigerian receiver, there is attempt to conceal the real intention of the sender through long, verbose use of words. The intention is deception and deflection.
According to Buller and Burgoon (1996), deception occurs when a sender deliberately conveys a message with intention of leading the receiver to reach a false conclusion. Stated pointedly, the sender manipulates the content of the message to convey meaning that is different from the truth.
Illocutionary qualities of the speech, the actual intention of the sender, can only be obtained by “connecting the dots.” For instance, it is stated that the National Defense and Security Council, before election day, obtained evidence detailing how huge sums of money were spent by both presidential candidates. It was also alleged that “there were documented and confirmed conflict of interest between the government and both presidential candidates which would compromise their positions and responsibilities were they to become president,” (Odunsi, 2017, para 12). The question then is: Why did the military government allow the election to proceed in the face of such “weighty allegations?”
Reasons the Message was Rejected
Nigerians strongly rejected the message and for many weeks after the speech, protesters took over major roads in many parts of Nigeria. Over 100 lives were lost across the country as soldiers and antiriot police engaged protesters with brutal force (Akinbode, 2021). Did the sender envisage the perlocutionary qualities, pain, utter disappointment and rage engendered by the speech? Perhaps the sender trusted his dubious attempt to deflect the anger of citizens and douse the tension by praising them for their patience while blaming the United Nations and an unnamed “global policeman” for undermining Nigeria’s sovereignty.
It is not uncommon for political leaders to use deception as strategy for communication. According to Depaulo et al (1996), deception occurs in one out of every four conversations. In Nigeria, where transparency and accountability in governance is low and trust between government and citizens is thin, deception is the rule rather than exception. The perlocutionary qualities, violent rage, persistent and sustained civil disobedience, elicited by the speech is the product of years of frustration and deprivation endured by Nigerians as Babangida’s regime violated their socioeconomic, political and civil rights (Anyanwu, 1992).
Also, another reason for poor landing of the message is hope placed on the promise of the undeclared winner of the annulled election. Abiola was the best known charismatic, philanthropist millionaire of his generation. Although a good friend of Babangida, in the months leading to the election, Abiola tried to distance himself from many of the unpopular policies of the regime and campaigned with the slogan “Hope ’93,” (Akinbode, 2021, Akinbode, 2022).
Reasons Political Leaders in Nigeria Favor Deception
In Nigeria, where state financial and political powers are at the unfettered disposal of the Head of State, the incentives for holding on to power perpetually are very high and deception is a favored communication strategy to keep citizens guessing and hopeful. After eight years of mazy dribbles, Babangida knew that Nigerians were fed up with his regime.
Characteristics of Deception
Consequently, in the annulment speech, Babangida unleashed all the elements of deception as outlined in Paul Grice’s Maxims, namely: (1) Falsification, making bogus unsubstantiated allegations. This is typified by the allegation that “foreign countries” are trying to interfere and undermine Nigeria’s sovereignty because representatives of those countries insist that the June 12 election was free and fair and the result should be released and the winner sworn in. (2) Depersonalization – framing the message of the annulment in a manner that distance the protagonist from the offensive action. In the speech, Babangida constantly used “we” and “the administration” instead of “I” and “my administration.” The aim is to deflect blame from the protagonist and create the impression that the annulment was a collective decision. (3) Equivocation – the act of using vague, wordy sentences without providing definite answers. Example is the sentence: “The history of our country is not the history of any other country in the world which is either practicing advanced democracy or struggling to lay the foundation for democracy,” though true, yet it does not provide reasons for annulling an election which was adjudged by impartial observers to be free and fair, (Odunsi, 2017, para 9); and (4) superficial promise, the act of giving futuristic promises in order to obtain immediate support. Example is the unbanning of politicians previously banned a year earlier by the regime to participate, with the excuse that the decision would “enrich the candidature of the election and at the same time tap the leadership resources of our country to the fullest.” This is designed to obtain support from a section of the population for an exercise with no termination date (Al-Hindawi and Al-Aadili, 2017; Odunsi, 2017, para 20).
Motives for Deception
Babangida’s motive for resorting to deception is rooted in his desperation to cling on to power beyond August 27, 1993 promised date for handover. Elman (1997) states three motives for use of deception as communication strategy: (1) To avoid hurting the feelings of associates or others in a group; (2) to save face and preserve self-esteem; and (3) to retain control by manipulating information available to the receiver.
While dishonest communication is condemnable in all forms and for any reason. In practice, pragmatism dictates that communicators sometimes resort to deception in order to save, or prolong a relationship or to save face in awkward situations. In politics, deception is used regularly by politicians to increase advantage by manipulating emotion of electorates or citizens through carefully structured information released to the public. The opaquer the society, the more common the use of this type of deception.
June 12 Election Annulment & Long-term Effects of Deception
More than three decades after the speech, General Babangida published his memoir, paradoxically titled: “A Journey in Service.” There, he admitted that election was free and fair (Amalu, 2025). Although Babangida accepted “responsibility” for the annulment, he put the blame for annulment on the shoulders of his chief of army staff, General Sani Abacha, whom he claimed was opposed to civilian administration. According to Babangida, Abacha was intent on becoming Head of State, and the health of the civilian administration was not guaranteed in such situation (Amalu, 2025).
Indeed, Abacha was Head of State from 1993 to 1998. He toppled the interim civilian administration led by Chief Ernest Shonekan, whom Babangida appointed after his hurried exit from government on August 27, 1993. Abacha died in power in 1998 and is not available to respond to the allegations against him. However, true “journey in service” would require that the interest of Nigeria should come first before personal or other narrow interests. If this was the case, Babangida would have retired Abacha along with other ambitious soldiers of fortune who may pose a threat to the health of the civilian administration. Instead he chose the easier path and plied Nigerians with deception.
Aside the Civil War (1967 – 1970), no other event caused Nigeria such huge economic loss and sociopolitical dislocation as the crisis that resulted from June 12 annulment (Adedayo, 2025). The spectre of looming civil war forced many non-indigenes to relocate from commercial cities in Southwest. Many political activists, especially members of National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) who called for de-annulment of June 12 election were assassinated and others were forced to flee Nigeria (Adedayo, 2025).
Sadly, in spite of the harsh lessons of June 12 annulment speech, political leaders in the current democratic dispensation still favor deception as communication strategy and this has further eroded trust between government and citizens.
Conclusion
June 12 was recently appropriately named “Democracy Day” by the federal government (Adebayo, 2019). However, true democracy is yet to be enthroned in Nigeria because political leaders consistently deploy deception, the type encouraged by Babangida as a strategy for communication and relationship with the citizens. June 12 Presidential Election will remain an indelible scar on the body politics of Nigeria until political leaders make conscious effort to increase transparency and accountability in governance and reduce the desperation to resort to deception.
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