Abstract
Donald Trump is determined to wreck the rule-governed, democratic world order created and supported by the U.S. since WW2, abandoning and confronting America’s traditional allies as he pushes his unilateral, “America First” agenda. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 76-yr-old political cum military alliance formed between North America and Western Europe is caught in the storm. How can the alliance sired on the crucible of multilateralism remain relevant in a new era of Trumpian unilateralism? For this to happen, Europe will need to step-up, weaned from U.S. support and adjust to shoulder more responsibility for the alliance. Time is of essence and time is what NATO and Europe does not have.
Key words: NATO, Unilateralism, Multilateralism, Donald Trump, Europe.
Introduction
If someone mentioned to General Dwight Eisenhower on December 19, 1950 when he was appointed the first Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in Europe, that a U.S. President would one day deride the supreme sacrifices of NATO soldiers and become the greatest threat to the alliance that preserved America’s honor against the might of Moscow and secured Europe’s economic and security interests in the delicate years after WW2, the resolute five star General would literally kill “the prophet of doom” with his scowl. Indeed, it would be unthinkable to numerous past U.S. presidents and political leaders, that the occupant of the White House would publicly question: Whether NATO would be there if the U.S. ever needed its support; or state that the U.S. never asked anything of NATO (Mackintosh, 2026).
Since its formation on April 4, 1949, NATO, as the heart of the symbiotic relationship between America and its allies, has served the political, economic and security interests of members of the alliance. The hostile and revanchist expeditions of Stalin’s Soviet Union in Greece, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Iran and elsewhere, undertaken under the guise of protecting Russia from future German aggression, convinced political leaders in Washington to shed their isolationist posturing and embrace multilateralism.
The goal of the U.S. was to provide an alternative to Russia’s hostile policy of forcefully absorbing and creating buffer states; to curb the spread of Soviet’s communism and political ideology which was antithetical to America’s democratic and free market beliefs. Washington’s solution was “collective security” (Vandenberg, 1945, p. 603). However, if the U.S. was going to be successful in containing Stalin’s Red Army, then, Europe had to be economically stable and integrated.
Indeed, WW 2 had left Europe in ruins, with cities flattened, and about 36.5 million Europeans dead. The extent of the carnage unleashed by Japan in Pearl Harbor attack and the devastation in Europe prompted U.S. Senator Arthur Vandenberg to publicly renounce his isolationist principles and embrace internationalism. The Senator, who was once a vocal critic of President Franklin Roosevelt confessed: “I have always been frankly one of those who believed in our own self-reliance. —- But I do not believe that any nation hereafter can immunize itself by its exclusive action.” In his speech on January 10, 1945, on the floor of the Senate, Vandenberg stated that Pearl Harbor and WW 2 have shown how science has promoted mass murder in warfare, and called for a united international action, “one for all, and all for one,” so future generations can live in peace, (Vandenberg, 1945, p. 603).
It is therefore fitting, that Vandenberg, as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was instrumental in mobilizing bipartisan support for the formation of NATO through the landmark policy that bears his name, the Vandenberg Resolution.
The formation of NATO was the culmination of a series of closely connected events that began in 1945. First came the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. Second was the signing of the Rio Pact on September 2, 1947. Then came the Brussels Pact on March 17, 1948 and the $12 billion Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe followed in April 1948. Expectedly, Article 5 of NATO mirrors Article 4 of the Brussels Pact and Article 3 of the Rio Pact. These treaties stipulate mutual defense assistance among members and are rooted in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (Garcia-Mora, 1951; NATO, 2026).
NATO, like other intergovernmental organizations (IGO), was created by people in government to fulfil certain purposes, namely: (1) to deter Soviet Union from further aggression and expansion in Europe and elsewhere; (2) to curb a renaissance of Nazi-like nationalist warmongering in Europe; and (3) to secure the peace necessary for Europe’s integration and prosperity (Klabbers, 2015; NATO, 2026). Also, NATO fulfils the functionalist paradigm of international organizations which state that international organizations exist to perform delegated functions extended by members (Klabbers, 2015). In its over 76 years of existence, NATO has evolved through adaptation in response to changing global political dynamics and within the powers delegated by members.
NATO has performed creditably in achieving its stated objectives. The military alliance through its “Massive Retaliation” principle succeeded in deterring the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War era. NATO established its Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), a military command in France as response to Moscow’s acquisition of the atomic bomb in 1949 and involment in the Korean War in 1950. The alliance later received Greece and Turkey, two states within Soviet Union’s radar as members in 1952 and West Germany in 1955; NATO outlived Soviet’s Warsaw Pact and absorbed former members of the military alliance; NATO successfully countered Moscow’s threat in Europe when Soviet Union threatened to invade Poland in 1980 (Brzezinski, 2021); the alliance witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall (BBC, 2019); the unification of Germany in October 1990; and ultimately, NATO outlived Soviet Union.
Aside from the significant blot concerning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the alliance succeeded in keeping Europe safe and deepened political and economic ties in the continent through its various programs. Overall, NATO is a success story of reinvention, yet, the alliance, fresh from subduing ISIS and other terrorist networks, currently faces significant tests both from its old foe Russia, and a more daunting opponent from within, the President of the U.S., and NATO’s major sponsor, who is determined to ignore America’s traditional allies as he embarks on unilateral policies that may sound the death knell for the military alliance. Is Trump justified in his assessment of NATO and the allies?
Timeline of Trump’s Contempt for NATO and US Allies
Trump had been chipping away at NATO since his campaign rallies leading to his first term. He described NATO as an “obsolete” alliance, designed for the Cold War era and not fit for fighting terrorism. Trump later backtracked on his comments. However, the U.S. President insists that NATO member states are “ripping the U.S. off,” and went as far as saying that if U.S. allies pull out of NATO because they are squeezed to pay up, then so be it (Parker, 2016).
One year into Trump’s second term, the relationship between the White House and U.S. allies has deteriorated. Trump 2.0 is different from Trump 1.0 in many ways. In his first term, Trump was learning the ropes on foreign relations in many ways. Also, his vice president and key advisers were globalists who explained to the President that it served U.S. interest to continue to maintain the multilateral architecture in place since 1945. For instance, during his first term, Trump tried to cut down the number of U.S. soldiers in Germany because of Germany’s unwillingness to meet the set defense benchmark for NATO (Cohen, 2020). However, a pushback from the President’s advisers and Congress truncated the move. Now in his 2nd term, Trump is sure of his place and is surrounded by carefully picked loyalists who align with the President. At the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Vice – President J.D. Vance, then a Senator representing Ohio, said he did not really care what happened to Ukraine and called on Europe to take responsibility for their security (Kalinauskas & Garrett, 2024). In 2025, Europeans were scandalized when the content of leaked Signal Chat revealed that Trump advisers regarded Europe as freeloaders (Gordon and Karlin, 2025; Adler, 2025). These views align with those of Trump and are reflected in the recently released National Defense Strategy by the Pentagon, (Keenan, 2026).
Is Trump Justified?
From inception, U.S. remains the cornerstone of NATO’s financial support, providing 7% of its GDP on NATO defense, while the European allies contributed 2-3% but many European allies were reluctant to meet even that lower threshold as these countries prioritize welfarist policies. The burden of defending Europe therefore fell on Washington (Wallander, 2025). Until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, only six members were meeting the 2% benchmark set in 2014 (Falkenek, 2024). The number increased after Russia’s threat in 2022, and 23 European countries met the set target in 2024. Poland made the largest contribution at 4.12% but even that is dwarfed by 3.4% contributed by the U.S. In 2025, all members met the 2% threshold but a new benchmark of 3.5% was set in June 2025. So far, only three countries met the latest threshold (Ford, 2025). The U.S. contributed 3.22% of its GDP in 2025, however, because of the size of its economy, the value of U.S. contribution, about $980 billion accounts for about 66% of the total contribution for 2025 (The Standard, 2026). Size matters and Trump effect is pushing members to step up their contribution. Trump is right to ask U.S. allies to step up their defense spending and they are stepping up, However, Trump is wrong to say NATO has not done anything for the U.S. Indeed, the U.S. has benefited immensely from its investment in NATO.
How U.S. Allies Through NATO Support U.S. National Interests
After WW2, U.S. saw that it served its interest to prevent the Soviet Union from absorbing Western Europe into its sphere of influence. Many reasons account for Washington’s decision: (1) A common cultural bond exists between Western Europe and the U.S., so protecting Western Europe from Soviet control was protecting shared common values; (2) Washington saw the wisdom in rebuilding Western Europe’s huge industrial and economic base and preventing same from falling into Russia’s orbit; (3) it was important to prevent a third world war in Europe; and (4) the effect of two world wars in Europe coupled with a world-wide economic depression left Europe desolate and placed the financial burden of defending Europe squarely on the U.S.
The $12 billion Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe would be recouped through Western Europe’s patronage of American goods and it was imperative that U.S. provide security umbrella for economic integration of Western Europe (Wallander, 2025). Several decades after WW2, Europe is U.S.’ largest trading partner, and together they account for one-third of the global trade in goods and services.
U.S. also benefits from investments in NATO through its over 30 military bases in Europe. These military bases were established mostly through bilateral agreements between the U.S. and individual NATO members, and often grants the U.S. access to the bases through waterways and airspaces in what is referred to as “ABO,” Access, Basing and Overflight (Wallander, 2025). For instance, because of its strategic location in the Arctic Circle, the U.S. signed a bilateral agreement with Iceland in 1951 under the transatlantic NATO structure to open a military base in Keflavik. It helped in surveillance of Soviet/Russia’s submarines in the North Atlantic (Torralba, 2025). In 2018, it reported developments in Russia’s Poseidon nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle which poses a direct threat to the West and by extension, the U.S. in particular (Cuesta, 2023).
One key importance of the U.S. military bases in Greenland and Iceland relates to the “GIUK Gap,” representing Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom. If Russia or a hostile country’s submarine escapes detection through the chokepoint of the GIUK Gap, they can travel within U.S. coastlines undetected and launch sudden nuclear attacks against American cities (Wallander, 2025). It for this reason that Pentagon spends a lot of resources to upgrade tracking mechanisms in its military bases in Europe, especially the GIUK countries. On its own, the U.S. would be unable to monitor and report approaching attack in timely manner. Support from NATO countries are crucial on this score. Also, U.S. military assets around Europe help Washington to perform its role of “global policing.” Another gain that accrues to the U.S. from NATO allies is the purchase of U.S.-made military hardware by member states. Although NATO members can procure their weapons or systems from any country so long as they attain NATO’s standards of interoperability, however, in order to enhance seamless joint operations, many NATO members procure U.S. made weapons/systems.
For example, in 2019, Poland approved $414 million for purchase of U.S.- made High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) (Scislowska, 2023). In 2025, eight Nordic and Baltic states pledged $500 million to purchase U.S. – made weapons to be delivered to Ukraine as part of the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative by NATO members (Fornusek, 2025). All these benefit the U.S. financially.
Also, NATO allies allow the U.S. to maintain its prestige and project its hegemonic power around the world. During the Arab-Israeli War (Yom Kippur) in 1973, Portugal allowed the U.S. to use its airspace to support Israel during Operation Nickel Grass (Anjum, 2024). Washington was given permission to use NATO allies’ air bases in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 terrorists attack and the subsequent military campaign in Afghanistan. U.S. remains the only NATO member to invoke Article 5 obligation of members.
NATO members defer to the U.S. on global issues due to Washington’s investment in NATO thereby helping the U.S. to project its policies. In 2003, many NATO members opposed Washington’s invasion of Iraq, yet these countries allowed U.S. use of their airspace and military bases during the conflict (Reuters, 2024; Wallander, 2025).
Another benefit is the use of European military bases to bolster U.S.’ global antiterrorism efforts. For instance, Diego Garcia, formerly under the U.K. is host to a U.S/U.K. military base and served US’ interests in the past and present. In 2024 the base was instrumental in U.S. defense of Israel against Iranian attack and in 2025 it served the U.S. to counter the hostile actions of Houthi rebels that was threatening global maritime trade.
In spite of these collective and multilateral, collaborative actions by the U.S. and it NATO allies, Trump says NATO and Washington’s allies are not doing enough. Disagreements and threats over Greenland could severe nearly century-old ties. But NATO is not new to internal conflicts between members of the alliance.
NATO and History of Internal Conflicts
NATO has weathered many internal conflicts in its long history. The alliance’s first major internal conflict was U.S.’ opposition to a joint UK and France military expedition in support of Israel to invade Egypt over the Suez Canal. Fearing Soviet intervention in support of Egypt and global backlash over the invasion, U.S. President Eisenhower sided with the United Nations and compelled the withdrawal of the invading European allies. It was the first signal in the change of power dynamics of world affairs (Milner, 2011).
In 1974, Greece withdrew from the alliance by exercising its rights under Article 13 because of conflict with Turkey. Ankara invaded Nicosia, to quell Athens-sponsored coup in Cyprus. Greece then pulled out of NATO because of the alliance’s inability to prevent Turkey from invading Cyprus (Duggal, 2026).
In 2003, France and the U.S. disagreed over Washington’s proposed invasion of Iraq. Earlier on in 1966, French President, Charles de Gaulle pulled his country out of NATO’s integrated command structure in a move intended to curb Washington’s influence and assert France’s sovereignty. Although France remained a NATO member, the decision forced NATO operational headquarters to be moved from France to Belgium.
Yet, NATO has never contended with a U.S. President like Trump, who defines national interest through his own prism and trivializes loyalty from U.S allies. If NATO is to outlive Trump 2.0, then, European allies must come up with a winning strategy to keep the alliance afloat and relevant.
The Way Forward
It must be obvious to decision makers in Europe by now that one plausible way to keep Trump in check and move the alliance forward is to invest in Europe and stand up to Washington when red lines are crossed. Gifts demonstrating ancestral cultural ties with Europe like those presented by Scotland and Germany, lavish parties as hosted by U.K. and flattery by NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, have insignificant effect on Trump. However, a united and collective push back by European allies over Greenland have seen Trump beat a retreat, withdrawing his threat of forceful annexation of Greenland and punitive tariffs after European countries sent troops to Greenland and promised to retaliate with their own “trade bazooka.”
Europe should stop outsourcing their security to U.S. Instead, the continent should look inward for its security needs. Some European allies like Germany, Denmark and others are already looking inward for their security needs. Germany is spending about 108 billion Euros in 2026 to modernize its military and step up its combat readiness, and unlike past years most of the equipment and systems would be sourced from European manufacturers instead of the U.S. (Werkhäuser, 2026; Gordon and Karlin, 2025). Berlin recently lifted long standing fiscal constraints on budget deficit with regards to defense in response to Russia’s hostile action in Europe and Trump’s changing policies (Lunday and Klöckner, 2026). Denmark is also following Germany’s footstep by making its biggest ever defense purchase from European manufacturers.
A new defence benchmark of 5% of GDP has been set for 2035 and European allies are determined to meet the target. Poland is already close to meeting that threshold and others are determined to follow. It is one way the allies can create the desired European Pillar within NATO to meet the U.S. as equal partner in what France refers to as “strategic autonomy” (Barigazzi and Jack, 2026). The goal for European allies and Canada must be to cooperate with the U.S. through respect and dignity instead of subservience. This is important if NATO is to remain relevant.
Conclusion
Vandenberg was right in 1945. Contrary to Trump’s belief, no state, including the U.S., can by itself be immune from the myriad of threats from hostile states and non-state actors. NATO allies are essential part of Washington’s strength. Iceland does not have a standing army and has only about half a million inhabitants, yet it is a founding NATO member because the founding fathers of the alliance recognized its strategic importance. Winston Churchill said of Iceland during WW2: “Whoever possesses Iceland holds a pistol firmly pointed at England, America and Canada,” (Torralba, 2025, para.4). Today, the fate of the U.S. is closely tied to its NATO allies and every member counts.
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